Contra Mind-Body Dualism, G.W. Leibniz

       Within the Monadology, Liebniz attempts to provide his account for the reality of the universe, as based on the simplest substance identified as a monad. One of his main causes for the discourse was to provide a more probable solution to the mind-body problem than the Cartesian idea of dualism.
       He states "..every living body has one dominant entelechy, which in an animal is its soul; but the parts of that living body are full of other living things...which also has its entelechy or dominant soul (p.69)", eventually leading him to say that "there are no spirits without bodies (p.72)". Further supported by the idea of the monad, which in itself has the predetermined mechanism of harmony with all the other monads, Liebniz establishes a system of reality that has less to do with how separate the mind and the body are in their respects to each other, but more with how all the monads are able to exist with those monads that are different based on this harmony. Previously, he also argued that each monad is different from each other in the sense that, when God created the first monad A, he then made other monads that in some qualities are not A, and one of the major ways in which they could be different is that they're either active or passive in respect to each other, aside from the qualitative difference.
       Some questions begin to arise; how is it that a monad of thought, or those exact qualities that for Cartesian followers constitutes the mind, can have substance? And even before that, to say that everything is made up of these tiny substantiated particles that are irreducible seems to imply that the mind is the only true existing thing, whereas matter, or extension, was just accidentally and simultaneously created as a fabric in the universe that only responds with modes in appearance or "perception (p.14)".
       The major goal of this system was to battle dualism with a combination of what seems to be a hybrid of teleology and the view of efficient causes, in that the monads act with bodies to carry out whatever quality it is they have within themselves or composite beings, without being able to influence each other or affect one another; they simply remain qualitatively different. However, I still cannot reconcile that, though this system is adequately logical, the monads are the only true substance, yet matter was just somehow created at the same time so that monads and substance coexist in appearance. Does this view battle dualism effectively, or does it have just as many cracks and flaws?

What is Real and Intelligible

The Treatise on the Emendation of Intellect, is supposed to give insight into how the mind can form ideas that are clear and distinct. However after reading the passages, I found myself asking the question what is real and intelligible? I think that the intended function of the intellect is to assess our immediate environment and communicate the information to our body so it could respond in whatever way appropriate and helps us to form our final decisions. The ideas that we accumulate through our past and present experience are clear and distinct. Our minds are active and associative from one situation to another. If we sit in silence and try to remain that way, thoughts will arise no matter how much we try to block our minds from it. Would these thoughts be considered “real and intelligible” or fiction? “A circle is one thing, the idea of a circle is another. For the idea of a circle is not something having a circumference and a center, as is a circle, nor is the ideas of a body itself a body. And since it is something different from its object, it will also be something intelligible through itself”(p170, 33). So when we know the nature of both the circle and the square it is impossible for us to combine the two, but I’ve seen square donuts. So the folks at the Donut Plant took one idea formed a new one, which in turn can be formed into something else that is both real and intelligible.

Unit of Mind and Body

The first twenty-three propositions of Ethics pt.2 deal with the human mind and its relation to the body. The most important of these, I think, are P11 (“That which constitutes the actual being of the human mind is basically nothing else but the idea of an individual actually existing thing”) and P13 (“The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body – i.e., a definite mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else). From these two propositions Spinoza establishes a unity of mind and body. But if a human mind is only the idea of its respective, actually existing human being, why make the distinction between mind and body at all? It seems as though Spinoza makes the mind out to be a transient phenomenon occurring within the human body. However he goes on to state that “it follows that man consists of mind and body, and the human body exists according as we sense it.” How can man consist of both mind and body when mind only exists insofar as it is the idea of an individual actually existing person? Either mind must be re-defined or man is only the respective physical body.

This flaw in Spinoza’s argument has consequences for the rest of his philosophy. If mind does not exist then the whole class of attributes called Thought cannot exist. This is because Thought is dependent upon the existence of a thinking faculty, namely the mind, without which it is non-existent. Additionally, Ideas cannot exist since they too are dependent upon an idea-forming entity like the mind. So if Thought and Ideas are dependent upon the existence of the mind, without which they cannot exist as attributes, then it follows that no mode of substance can possess these attributes. This means that neither God nor humans can possess the attribute of Thought, which Spinoza would find to be absurd.

Existing Inside of God

From Proposition 21 onwards Spinoza reaches one of his most important claims, that God is the cause of both the existence and essence of everything. Everything lives inside of God, he has determined the particular ways in which nature functions; he is the one and only infinite substance from which everything we know of stems from. Does this mean finite things are made out of an infinite substance? How is that possible? Even things that have a designated start and finish still have to, in some way, come from God. It’s within the proof of Proposition 28 that Spinoza addresses my question. His answer: finite things must have been caused by other finite things which had to be caused by other finite things etc etc. I’m not necessarily satisfied with this answer. He goes on to then bring up the concepts of “Natura Naturans” and “Natura Naturata” as a mode of explanation, in which he describes “Natura Naturans” as something conceived through itself, and “Natura Naturata” as things that come out of necessity of God’s nature.

While reading through the appendix of Part I, the adage “Perspective is reality” kept running through my mind. Such is true on an individual level concerning man, but also on a much broader scale. In the quest to figure out final causes, humans constantly have to come to believe that the world was created for their own advantage, and that man is meant to worship God in hopes to stay within his good graces, and receive the benefits of these graces. Spinoza states that this is far from the case. Ultimately, things were not created with human standards in mind; they were not made in attempts to fit into our fabricated ideals of beautiful and ugly, good and bad, but for their sole purposes alone. “Nature has no fixed goal and that all final causes are but figments of the human imagination.” (Pg. 26) Within this one statement he discredits teleology, his discredits the idea that we can explain things through their purposes, for their purpose has nothing to do with us, it is something all in its own. Ultimately, the perfection of things in nature cannot be measured on a human scale, but in terms of themselves, and nothing else. It’s the same as disregarding a genre of music or cuisine because we don’t personally like it, that would just be absurd.

Difference and Unity in God

Difference is possible in two ways “Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or by the difference of the affections of substance” (1P4). That is, there are two types of difference: formal and modal difference.  I’m just going to address formal difference.  Substances with different attributes are distinct formally, because they possess separate, independent essences. An attribute is what “the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence”(1D4). But really, we are saying substance insofar as it is expressed by this attribute. One might wonder why Spinoza distinguishes between substance and attribute at all, since it will turn out that each attribute must be able to be conceived by itself, which is part of the definition of substance.

The answer is that if he cannot distinguish substance from attributes, then there are an infinite number of attributes, possibly, but we have no explanation for that nor for the possibility of God’s existence. In addition to a concept of difference, Spinoza needs one that explains unity.  Otherwise, there will be no reason to believe that there is any relation between different attributes, and, eventually, the world would be separated into an infinite number of possible worlds, each of which possessing an absolutely unique essence. In other words, in order for Spinoza to think unity in “Nature” whatsoever, he has to posit a distinction between substance and attributes, by which attributes are distinct, but this does not mean that substances are different.

In some ways, Spinoza’s proof for the existence of God amounts to an argument that there is no reason to distinguish substances from one another, since they are distinct only in attribute, they could be the same single substance. 1P5, P6 and P10 speak of the irreducibility of the attributes (or substance conceived by the different attributes). P7, P8 and P9 are all premises towards P11, establishing the necessary existence, infinity and “reality or being”.  P9 is especially important, because only on these grounds are we lead to conceive a reason for a substance containing more than one attribute. But the proofs of P11 seem to depend primarily on the necessary existence of God.  The first is simply the ontological proof, that existence necessarily belongs to, or “is involved in”, his essence. The second claims that the absolutely infinite being is not a contradictory notion, or there is no reason contrary to such a being. The third proof is a posteriori, following the supposition that if anything exists, an omnipotent being exists. But P11 is then supplemented by P12, P13 and P14, which go towards establishing not merely that a single substance is a non-contradictory idea, but also that God must be an eminently simple being.

What is "Finite"? What is "Infinite"?

Spinoza offers various definitions, explanations (of certain definitions), axioms and premises in Part 1 of Ethics. The most note-worthy concepts that Spinoza provides are the premises, which serve as foundations for his arguments in establishing certain truths. Before Spinoza starts his arguments, he reinforces the validity of his premises with the provided definitions and axioms lest he wishes for others to accuse him of arguing on pre-supposed premises.

The point here is not so much as to examine and analyze the validity of his Spinoza’s premises, but rather, to point out the ambiguities and confusions that appear in his work. His most outrageous of claims lies with P8 in which Spinoza states that “all substance is necessarily infinite” (p.6). He defends this claim on the ground that everything has its own substance, that is, everything has its own unique essence and with essence comes existence. From there, he elaborates that the existence in question must be either finite or infinite and he rejects the notion of finitude because other substances of the same nature can only limit substances. However, because there are no such substances being of the same nature, then substances cannot fall under limitations and is therefore infinite. As deductively sound as that may be, the mere notion that everything is ultimately infinite is completely baffling. When speaking of substance, do people not automatically assume something of the physical nature? If that is so, how can physical objects such as a human body, an air conditioner, or a bag of Skittles be infinite? For these physical objects to be of the infinite nature, does it not mean that one cannot ever estimate their exact sizes? However, many, if not all, people have a clear idea of just how big their bodies or a bag of Skittles are. The problem here is either that the premise is simply absurd or there is a misunderstanding of the terms “finite” and “infinite”. Since Spinoza does not define such terms, one cannot help but find this premise to be confusing.

Spinoza later uses the same notion of infinity to claim in P11 “God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists” (p.8). Those with a belief in the existence of God will readily agree to His infinite being, but and it is not to say that the existence of all things known to be real ought to be doubted of their realness. The problem here is once again the supposition of these things being of an infinite nature. Once again, the size of a person’s body or a piece of Skittles is of a calculable size, that is, a size of limitations. Why can it not be that certain objects of finitude also necessarily exist as well? The bag of sweet smelling Skittles seated across the room seems awfully real and in existence. Once again, what exactly does Spinoza mean for something to be “finite” or “infinite”?

Riches, Honour, Sensual Pleasure.... The Evil Trinity of Our Existence

The title of this blog references Spinoza's revolutionary ideology of finding a "true good" among his surroundings and dominant influences. Spinoza believes we are brain washed into thinking what is important in our lives. This "Evil Trinity" of riches, honour and sensual pleasure is presented to our society as the answer to our question of what this life is all about. As students, about to embark into our next stage of life, many options are presented to us. The question is how strong we are to conjure for ourselves a meaningful path and existence. To break apart from what we know and enter into the unknown. Looking into the abyss, we are frightened but excited, willing but afraid. It is hard to break apart from our past and present condition and accept and embrace an unknown path and ideology. As Spinoza writes "Losing a certain good for the sake of an uncertain good"( The Essential Spinoza, pg.165). Spinoza believes that thinking for ourselves and creating our own method of living is crucial, regardless of the risk . Spinoza believes that our very existence is depended upon grasping the unknown, dissataching ourselves from comfort and leaping in to the great abyss of the unknown and uncertain.

Reading poetry at home, working at our church or temple on the weekend, meditating at our lunch break. These are all ways of finding meaning situated between our normal existence of work and daily habituation. Is this enough though? Spinoza believes not as he writes " I therefore debated whether it might be possible to arrive at a new guiding principle-or at least the sure hope of its attainment -without changing the manner and normal routine of my life.This I frequently attempted but in vain"(The Essential Spinoza, pg.164). The "true good" that Spinoza believes is above all else requires a leap of faith into a new world that is without the three elements of honour, riches and sensual pleasure. But this new world is an abyss that can be pierced at but not truly understood until one is truly enmeshed within it.

The truth is that most of us are consumed by sex, money and status on a daily level. It constricts our perception of the universe and ourselves. "With these three the mind is so distracted that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other good"(pg.164). We must extract ourselves from this life to understand ourselves. It is not enough to insert periodically our most importamt beliefs into daily monotonus existence. We must extract ourselves and leap into another sphere of existence that suppourts our most cherished beliefs and ideologies.