Friday, October 28, 2011
Contra Mind-Body Dualism, G.W. Leibniz
Within the Monadology, Liebniz attempts to provide his account for the reality of the universe, as based on the simplest substance identified as a monad. One of his main causes for the discourse was to provide a more probable solution to the mind-body problem than the Cartesian idea of dualism.
He states "..every living body has one dominant entelechy, which in an animal is its soul; but the parts of that living body are full of other living things...which also has its entelechy or dominant soul (p.69)", eventually leading him to say that "there are no spirits without bodies (p.72)". Further supported by the idea of the monad, which in itself has the predetermined mechanism of harmony with all the other monads, Liebniz establishes a system of reality that has less to do with how separate the mind and the body are in their respects to each other, but more with how all the monads are able to exist with those monads that are different based on this harmony. Previously, he also argued that each monad is different from each other in the sense that, when God created the first monad A, he then made other monads that in some qualities are not A, and one of the major ways in which they could be different is that they're either active or passive in respect to each other, aside from the qualitative difference.
Some questions begin to arise; how is it that a monad of thought, or those exact qualities that for Cartesian followers constitutes the mind, can have substance? And even before that, to say that everything is made up of these tiny substantiated particles that are irreducible seems to imply that the mind is the only true existing thing, whereas matter, or extension, was just accidentally and simultaneously created as a fabric in the universe that only responds with modes in appearance or "perception (p.14)".
The major goal of this system was to battle dualism with a combination of what seems to be a hybrid of teleology and the view of efficient causes, in that the monads act with bodies to carry out whatever quality it is they have within themselves or composite beings, without being able to influence each other or affect one another; they simply remain qualitatively different. However, I still cannot reconcile that, though this system is adequately logical, the monads are the only true substance, yet matter was just somehow created at the same time so that monads and substance coexist in appearance. Does this view battle dualism effectively, or does it have just as many cracks and flaws?
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I thought leibniz said that god was the only substance, which is perfect and necessary. From that follow the monads which are imperfect only because they are limited, otherwise they would be divine as he calls them, which would be absurd.
ReplyDeleteAnother problem I had while reading this short essay was that he solves the mind-body problem simply by arguing that body and soul are both part of the same substance. Body is just a vessel for the soul because it is the least real thing ( perception) and soul is the closest to perception ( coming from god ). He sounds a lot like spinoza except he uses teleology and efficient causes to explain the world.
Question: are you trying to argue that Liebniz is a hard materialist?
ReplyDeleteI agree with Arturo that, at times, Liebniz sounds a lot like Spinoza. The monads are extremely reminiscent of many aspects of the substance, for me.
As far as your final question, whether or not this view is an effective answer to dualism and the mind-body problem, I, for one, have to say that materialism (of which I think this is a variety) seems to make a lot more sense not only in terms of the problem of other minds but also the law of the conservation of energy in physics. It's never been entirely clear to me how something immaterial (mind / soul / whatever) is supposed to have an effect on something material (the body), like in the case where I will my arm to move in a circle. How would that work exactly, if the mind and the brain are distinct entities, and one of them is of the "immaterial" realm?
Julian brings forth the idea of Leibniz that “every living body has one dominant entelechy”. I believe that the second part of his statement that the “parts of that living body are full of other living things, plants, animals, each of which also has its entelechy or dominant soul” is the most unique because its theoretical implications. We always hear the mantra that “Everything is connected”. We hear this cliché but does it truly resonate within us as a truism that has cosmological significance for all of nature and humanity. Unfortunately, for the most part, our day to day existence is relatively on the surface. How close to we truly examine out surroundings? How deep do we truly go to find the truth? Every living body, no matter how deep you go, brings forth another world that is just waiting to be discovered. It might sound hackneyed but this is the true nature of this multi layered reality that Leibniz is trying to present in his Monadology.
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