The first twenty-three propositions of Ethics pt.2 deal with the human mind and its relation to the body. The most important of these, I think, are P11 (“That which constitutes the actual being of the human mind is basically nothing else but the idea of an individual actually existing thing”) and P13 (“The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body – i.e., a definite mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else). From these two propositions Spinoza establishes a unity of mind and body. But if a human mind is only the idea of its respective, actually existing human being, why make the distinction between mind and body at all? It seems as though Spinoza makes the mind out to be a transient phenomenon occurring within the human body. However he goes on to state that “it follows that man consists of mind and body, and the human body exists according as we sense it.” How can man consist of both mind and body when mind only exists insofar as it is the idea of an individual actually existing person? Either mind must be re-defined or man is only the respective physical body.
This flaw in Spinoza’s argument has consequences for the rest of his philosophy. If mind does not exist then the whole class of attributes called Thought cannot exist. This is because Thought is dependent upon the existence of a thinking faculty, namely the mind, without which it is non-existent. Additionally, Ideas cannot exist since they too are dependent upon an idea-forming entity like the mind. So if Thought and Ideas are dependent upon the existence of the mind, without which they cannot exist as attributes, then it follows that no mode of substance can possess these attributes. This means that neither God nor humans can possess the attribute of Thought, which Spinoza would find to be absurd.
a couple of points:
ReplyDelete1) I fail to see why Thought itself is dependent upon the existence of a thinking faculty. Couldn't it simply be the case, as weird as it might sound to say, that thought is some sort of unobserved phenomenon? I'm not, for the record, saying this is the case, but I'm just pointing that its a possibililty.
2) I agree heartily that the distinction between mind and body seems absurd in Spinoza. I think that if you really follow his logic through, you would have to say that mind and body are the same thing. Something like, "the mind is the brain". Distinguishing between mind and body seems to imply some sort of mind-body dualism, but I don't think Spinoza would mean to argue that.
Who says that thought is dependent on the existent of a thinking thing? Not Spinoza, who says that the intellect, finite or divine, is a mode of the attribute of thought. Not even Descartes.
ReplyDeleteSpinoza did not try to argue that mind and body are separate as in Descartes' language. He makes a distinction between thought and extension which are attributes of ONE substance. This distinction is trying to reconcile Descartes pineal gland argument which falls flat on its face during Spinoza's time where science was erasing past philosophical thought.
ReplyDeleteSpinoza is not quite in the same denomination as Descartes, so thinking about Spinoza's reasoning about the mind and body dualism does not seem to apply here. I think Arturo is closer here in saying that thought and the body are just attributes. We as human beings are simply modes, given these attributes, of the larger classification of the substance. Without the mind, all of our sensations of our own body would probably have no meaning. I think he's just trying to establish that there is a difference between these two attributes, but it's just not necessarily as vast as Descartes puts it.
ReplyDeleteTo quote a famous philosopher, "I think therefore i am". Lets think about that. In order to think one just have the mental ability to reason and produce ideas and these ideas are a collection of thoughts. Be that as it may all these are concepts that have no connection to the external world other than the vessel it came from, "mind" and body which it is housed in. Case in point, there is no part of the brain that makes thoughts or ideas, they almost dare I say magically come into existence partially out of our experience with the external world.
ReplyDeleteSpinoza does not really say that the mind and body actually connect by cause; however that is what Descartes maintains. I agree with Julian with regard to our bodies not having any sensations without the mind. I find it hard to digest that we could feel things like love, pain, and sorrow without it. When the body is destroyed than the mind is destroyed.
ReplyDeleteIn light of this discussion, a few questions come to 'mind'. How exactly is 'thought' being defined? How also do the philosophical principles put forth by Descartes and Spinoza which are seemingly species-centric geared towards humans solely, hold up against 21st Century Artificial Intelligence? If I have a very advanced computer which has the ability to question its existence, does it exist? Do the Spinozan rules not apply? How do we explain thoughts and dreams which are generated by physical manipulation (for example electrical stimulation) of specific areas of the brain (body)?
ReplyDeleteSpinoza’s P.11 II, seems to be a direct attack on Descartes’ notion of a Mind + Body Dualism. Descartes states in the Cogito that the mere fact that he thinks is enough to prove his existence because in order to have thought, there must be a Thinker (an existence). In that sense, Descartes’ mind and existence is completely independent of his body. He even questions at one point whether this physical body is real or not. He may be sure of his existence but not his physical existence. Spinoza on the other hand unites the Body and Mind in P.11 by saying that the Mind only exists in so far that it conjures up an idea of a physical body. Spinoza notes, “the idea is that which basically constitutes the being of the human mind. But not the idea of a non-existing thing, for then the idea itself could not be said to exist” (35). An idea can only be said to exist so long as that there is an extended mode to represent the idea. From that point, it seems that Spinoza is advocating for a Mind + Body Unity theory in contrast to Descartes’ Mind + Body Dualism theory. However, the problem with Spinoza’s theory lies in the fact that Spinoza did not vouch for why thinking of the non-existing would equate to the idea itself also being non-existent. Why is it that there must be a physical extension in order to prove the existence of the idea? Can it not be as stated in the Cogito that simply because there is thought that there is existence?
ReplyDeleteThought is an infinite attribute, but only comes from ones mind and is proven through physical existence. One’s mind is the same as ones body. Ones body is a finite mode. Therefore this infinite attribute ultimately comes from a finite mode? I think Spinoza kind of trips over his own toes when bringing in this idea of mind + body unity into play after all his hard work differentiating between finite and infinite in part one of the ethics. But maybe I’m just too hung up on the distinction between infinite and finite. But I think this does bring a legitimate question to mind: how does one explain thought without a mind? On one hand I do have trouble conceiving thought just be an attribute floating in air without someone to think it but at the same time have even more trouble with the idea that ideas cant exist without a physical extension to represent it. Isn’t that the very definition of an idea, a thought before/without a physical element?
ReplyDelete